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Article 4

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
Robert P. George*
There is a sense in which twentieth century legal philosophy began on January 8, 1897. On that day, Oliver Wendell Holmes, then a
justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, spoke at a ceremony dedicating the new hall of the Boston University School of
Law. In his remarks, which were published that spring in the Harvard
Law Review under the title The Path of the Law,' Holmes proposed to
debunk the jurisprudence of the past and to propose a new course for
modem jurists and legal scholars. Holmes' themes-the question of
law's objectivity and the relationship between law and morality-have
preoccupied legal philosophy in the century that was then dawning
and is now drawing to a close. They have figured centrally in the work
of our honoree, Kent Greenawalt. My mission is to survey the treatment of these themes by some other influential twentieth century British and American legal philosophers and jurists and to make some
observations about where we find ourselves a hundred years or so after publication of The Path of the Law.
Let us look first, though, at Holmes's own treatments of his
themes. The opening sentence of his lecture invited his audiencelawyers, law professors, and law students-to consider what it is we
study when we study law. We are not, he said, studying a "mystery,"
but rather, "a well known profession." 2 People are willing to pay lawyers to advise and represent them because "in societies like ours the
command of the public force is entrusted to the judges in certain
cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary,
to carry out their judgments and decrees."3 Now, this is a fearsome
power. So, "[p] eople will want to know under what circumstances and
how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much
stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out
* Cyrus Hall McCormick Professor ofJurisprudence, Princeton University. BA.,
Swarthmore College, 1977; M.T.S. andJ.D., Harvard University, 1981; D.Phil., Oxford
University, 1986.
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. R v. 458 (1897).

2 Id at 457.
3 Id.
1533
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when this danger is to be feared."4 The object of the study of law,
therefore, "is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public
force through the instrumentality of the courts."5
This was the thesis of The Path of the Law. It was intended, I believe, as a provocation. And so, Holmes formulated it in provocative
ways:
[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man
does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that
way by judgment of the court.... The prophecies of what the courts
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by
the law.... The duty to keep a contract at common law means a
prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it-and
6
nothing else ....
Of course, the power of provocation is enhanced to the extent
one obscures one's intention to provoke. And so Holmes claimed
7
merely to be proposing a "business-like understanding of the matter.
And such an understanding, he insisted, requires us strictly to avoid
confusing moral and legal notions. This is difficult, Holmes suggested, because the very language of law-a language of "rights," "duties," "obligations," "malice," "intent," etc.-lays a "trap" for the
unwary. "For my own part," he declared in another famously provocative sentence, "I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every
word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether,
and other words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored
by anything outside the law."
Holmes' implicit denial of law's objectivity is not unconnected to
his insistence on the strict separation of moral and legal notions.
"One of the many evil effects of the confusion between legal and
moral ideas," he stated, "is that theory is apt to get the cart before the
horse, and to consider the right or the duty as something existing
apart from and independent of the consequences of its breach, to
which certain sanctions are added afterward." 9 A corrective, according to Holmes, was to adopt the viewpoint of a "bad man" when trying
to understand the law as such:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as
a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which
4
5
6
7
8
9

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at

458-62.
459.
464.
458.
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[legal] knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who
finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of
°
it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.1
And what exactly is being corrected by adopting the bad man's point
of view?
You will find some text writers telling you that [the law] is something different from what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts
or England, that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction from
principles of ethics or admitted axioms or what not, which may or
may not coincide with the decisions. But if we take the view of our
friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care two straws for
the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know what the
Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact."
"I am," Holmes declared, "much of his mind. The prophecies of what
the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
2
mean by the law."'
Still for all his skepticism-legal and moral-Holmes denied that
his was "the language of cynicism": 13
The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its
history is the history of the moral development of the race. The
practice of it, in spite of our popular jests, tends to make good citizens and good men. When I emphasize the difference between law
and morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of learning
and understanding the law.14
Going still further, Holmes claimed to "venerate the law, and especially our system of law, as one of the vastest products of the human
mind."' 5 It was not, he assured his readers, disrespect for the law that
prompted him to "criticize it so freely," 16 but rather a devotion to it
7
that expresses itself in a desire for its improvement.'
Holmes' aim was merely, he said, to expose some common fallacies about what constitutes the law. For example, some peopleHolmes doesn't tell us who they are-hold that "the only force at
work in the development of the law is logic."' 8 This erroneous way of
thinking is, Holmes advised his audience, "entirely natural" for law10

Id at 359.

11
12

Id. at 460-61.
Id. at 461.

13 Id. at 459.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 473.
16 Id
17 See id at 474.
18 Id at 465.
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yers, given their training in logic with its "processes" of analogy, discrimination, and deduction, but it is erroneous nevertheless.
Moreover, "the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind."1 9 "But," Holmes
went on to say"-without, it should be added, the slightest hesitation or
expression of doubtcertainty generally is an illusion, and repose is not the destiny of
man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative
worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an
articulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root
20
and nerve of the whole proceeding.
Now, this is getting interesting. The man who would later utter, in
another connection, that famous aphorism that "the life of the law has
not been logic, it has been experience," has already told his audience
in this lecture that law is a matter of prediction, of prophecies of what
courts will do in fact. And he has expressed great skepticism about
the role of logic in guiding the decisionmaking of judges whose rulings, one way or the other, will constitute the law. So, how are those
decisions to be rationally guided? What is "the law" from the perspective, not of the "bad man" but of the "good judge," who facing a disputed question of law will not be comforted by the assurance that "the
law" is a prediction of how he will in fact resolve the case? In fact,
what he wishes to do is to resolve the case according to the law. That,
he supposes, is his job. He wants to rule on the matter favorably to
the litigant whose cause is supported by the superior legal argument.
But what constitutes legal argument? What are the sources of law
upon which legal reasoning operates?
Of course, one candidate for inclusion in the list of legal sources
is history. And according to Holmes, "The rational study of law is still
to a large extent the study of history."21 Is this good or bad? "History
must," Holmes says, "be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is our business to
know. '22 But then comes the punch line: "It is a part of the rational
study, because it is the first step toward an enlightened skepticism,
that is, toward a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those
23
rules."
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 466.
IML
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id.
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So, history is not a source in the sense that the legal rules uncovered (and whose meaning is clarified)by historical inquiry are authorities that guide the reasoning of the conscientious judge. On the
contrary, such study has its value in exposing such rules to "an enlightened skepticism" regarding their value. But then, by appeal to what
standards are such judgments of value to be made? And-most critically-are these standards internal to the law or external? Does the
judge discover the proper standards in the legal materials-the statutes, the cases, the learned treatises-or bring them to those materials? If the latter, then what is the discipline from which he derives
them?
These are questions that will be central to the theoretical reflections of jurists and legal scholars for a hundred years. They will be
answered one way by Jerome Frank and his fellow "legal realists" in
the first half of the twentieth century, and precisely the opposite way
by Ronald Dworkin and his followers in the second half. H.L.A.
Hart-the most influential of the English-speaking legal philosophers
of our century-will refer to the realists' answer as the "nightmare"
that law does not exist, and to Dworkin's answer as the "noble dream"
that law as such provides a "right answer"-a single uniquely correct
resolution-to every dispute which makes its way into the
courtroom.

24

Holmes's own answer was tantalizingly ambiguous. In The Path of
the Law, he said at one point, "I think... the judges themselves have
failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations
of social advantage." 25 At another point he made this remarkable
statement:
I look forward to a time when the part played by history in the explanation of [legal] dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends
sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring them. As a step
toward that ideal it seems to me that every lawyer ought to seek an
26
understanding of economics.
Three-quarters of a century later, Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook,
Richard Epstein, Guido Calebresi, and other theorists and practitioners of the "economic analysis of law" would take this last piece of advice quite literally. Their books, law review articles, and-in the cases
24 See H.LA. Hart, AmericanJurisprudenceThrough English Eyes: The Nightmare and
the Noble Dream, in EssAmS INJURISPRUDENcE AND PHILOsOPiY 123,123-24 (H.LA. Hart
ed., 1983).
25 Holmes, supra note 1, at 467.
26 Id,at 474.
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of Posner, Easterbrook, and, most recently, Calebresi-judicial opinions would subject legal rules and social policies to cost-benefit tests
and other forms of economic analysis to assess their instrumental rationality and thus, in some cases, their legal validity. What these scholars and jurists do fits pretty well with Holmes' desire for lawyers and
judges to "consider the ends which the several rules seek to accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired, what is given up to gain
them, and whether they are worth the price." 27 But one must ask,
would Holmes really approve their doing it?
Although Holmes was, in his politics, "a moderate, liberal reformer,"28 he Was resolutely determined, as a judge, not to "legislate
from the bench." Indeed, during a period of unprecedented 'Judicial
activism," he became the symbol of opposition to the judicial usurpation of legislative authority under the guise of interpreting the Constitution. As a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, he
drew as sharp a line as any jurist of his time between "law" and "politics"-even when the politics in question concerned political economy. In what is perhaps his most celebrated dissent, Holmes
castigated the majority in the 1905 case of Lochner v. New York, 29 which
invalidated a state law setting maximum working hours for employees
in bakeries on the ground that such a regulation violated the "freedom of contract" that was held to be implicit in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Holmes argued that this socalled "substantive due process" doctrine was an invention designed to
authorize what was, in fact, the illegitimate judicial imposition of a
theory of economic efficiency and the morality of economic relations
on the people of the states and the nation.3 0 His claim was not that
there was anything defective in that theory; on the contrary, its "social
darwinist" dimensions held considerable appeal to him. Rather, it was
that judges had no business substituting their judgments of efficiency
and value for those of the people's elected representatives in Congress
and the state legislatures. They, he said, should be able to go to hell
in their own way!
It is not that any of this is flatly inconsistent with what Holmes
said in The Path of the Law. Indeed, at one point in that lecture he
seems to suggest that training in economics and a due weighing of
considerations of social advantage will have the salutary effect of encouraging judicial restraint. "I cannot but believe," he declared,
27

M at 476.

28 J.W. HARRIS, LEGAL
29 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
30

See id.

PHILOSOPHIES

94 (1980).
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that if the training of lawyers led them habitually to consider more
definitely and explicitly the social advantage on which the rule they
lay down must be justified, they sometimes would hesitate where
now they are confident, and see that really they were taking sides
31
upon debatable and often burning questions.
But plainly Holmes, as a judge-and, above all, as a dissenting
judge-is supposing that the law is something more than merely a
prophecy of what the courts will in fact decide. As a dissenter, he
holds that the courts have decided the case incorrectly. Of course, he
does not deny that their rulings-even where incorrect-have the
binding force of law, at least until they are reversed by higher courts
of appeal; but he does suppose that the judges in the majority "got the
law wrong." So, apparently, judges resolving disputes should be
guided, in some significant sense, by law. And this presupposes the
reality of law, and indeed, the preexistence of law, as something more
32
than a "prophec[y] of what courts will do in fact."
So we must press the question: To what standards of legal correctness should the judge look in reasoning to the resolution of a case?
Are the standards internal to the legal materials and discoverable, by
some method, in them? Or are they external? Do judges "find" the
law? Or do they, necessarily, "create" it? Can lawyers predict or
"prophesy" what a good and conscientious judge will do by figuring
out what he should do in light of the legal materials which should
control his reasoning? If that is all Holmes means by "prediction" and
"prophecy," then his debunking exercise is, for all its provocative language, far less skeptical than it appeared.
Drawing their inspiration from Holmes, however, there soon
emerged a group of legal scholars who were prepared, for awhile at
least, to expose the idea of law to truly radical skepticism. The legal
realist movement, which reached the peak of its influence in the
1930s and '40s, advanced the debunking project well beyond the
point at which Holmes had left things in The Path of the Law. Felix
Cohen, Karl Llewelyn, Jerome Frank, and others pressed to an extreme the idea of jurisprudence as an essentially "predictive" enterprise. "Law," according to Llewellyn, was what "officials do about
33
disputes."1
In accounting for their decisions, he insisted, it could only
rarely be true to say that they are guided by rules. The trouble is
not-or not just-that judges and other officials are willful, and thus
willing to lay aside the clear command of legal rules in order to do as
31 Holmes, supra note 1, at 468.
32
33

Holmes, supra note 1, at 462.
KARL LLEwLLYN, THE BRAmBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAw AND ITS STUDY 12 (1951).
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they please. It is that legal rules are necessarily vague and susceptible
of competing reasonable interpretations and applications. Even the
problem of selecting which rule to apply to a given set of facts can
only rarely be solved by looking to a clear rule of selection. The result
is a measure of indeterminacy that makes nonsense of the idea of
legal objectivity. The key to understanding the phenomenon of lawaccounting for what judges and other officials do or predicting what
they will do about disputes-is not the analysis of legal rules. It must
be something else. True, judges and other officials cite the rules in
justifying their decisions. But if we are to be realistic about what is
going on, according to Llewellyn, we must recognize that this is the
mere legal rationalization of decisions reached on other grounds.
Frank's realism was, if anything, still more extreme in its denial of
legal objectivity. Going beyond Llewellyn's "rule-skepticism," Frank
declared himself to be a "fact-skeptic" as well.3 4 Thus he denied law's
objectivity even in the rare cases in which a clear rule was clearly applicable. Since rules must be applied to facts in order to generate a legal
outcome, everything depends on findings of fact in trial courts and
other fact-finding tribunals. And facts are, in most cases, virtually as
indeterminate as legal rules. In statements that seem eerily, well...
realistic, in the aftermath of the O.J. Simpson trial, Frank argued that
our perceptions of facts are deeply influenced by conscious and subconscious beliefs, attitudes, and prejudices that vary among groups
and individuals. So the key to understanding law-understood in
legal realist terms-is understanding people's beliefs, attitudes, and
prejudices, and why they hold them. Since law is a sort of epiphenomenon of human psychology, legal scholarship should be directed to
scientific (e.g., psychological) and social scientific studies of human
motivation. To be realistic, it should abandon the idea that law preexists and is available to guide legal decisions.
The legal realists' insistence on the indeterminacy of law would,
in our own time, be reasserted by advocates of "critical legal studies,"
though this time in the service of a "new left" political agenda and
with nothing like the realists' faith in the objectivity and explanatory
power of the natural and social sciences. The realists themselves were,
like Holmes, political progressives-moderate liberals-eager to bring
instrumental rationality to bear to solve social problems. Many were
New Dealers. A few became judges, and those who did were, like
Holmes, far less radical in practice than their theoretical views would
have led one to predict. Although appeals to the alleged findings of
social science became an increasingly common feature of judicial
34

See generallyJEROME FRANK,

LAW AND THE MODERN MIND

(1930).
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opinions as the twentieth century wore on, realists who became judges
rarely cited their own subjective views or prejudices or psychological
predilections as grounds for their decisions. Rather, they cited legal
rules as the ultimate reasons for their decisions and claimed, at least,
to lay aside their own preferences in fidelity to the law. (Interestingly,
in the aftermath of the revelation of Nazi atrocities in Europe, Frank
declared himself, in the Preface to the Sixth Edition of his Law and the
Modem Mind, to be a follower of the natural law teaching of Saint
Thomas Aquinas on the basic questions of law and morality. Nothing
in his earlier writings, he insisted, was ever meant to suggest
85
otherwise. )
Of course, realism had its appeal precisely because it was, from a
certain vantage point, realistic. Trial lawyers take issues of venue and
voir dire very seriously because they know-and knew long before the
O.J. Simpson case-that who is on the jury can be critical to whether
facts are found favorably to their clients. And one of the first questions lawyers at any level of litigation want to know the answer to is
who are the judge orjudges who will be making determinations of law
at the trial or on appeal. Often enough, differentjurors or a different
judge or judges means different results. So far forth, the phenomenon of law includes strong elements of "subjectivity."
But the realists overstated their case. Their argument falters
under the same question we put to Holmes a little while ago. From
the point of view of conscientious judges, the law is not-for it cannot
be-a prediction of their own behavior. Often they, like Holmes, will
be faced with what they themselves perceive to be a duty to follow
rules whose application generates outcomes that run contrary to their
personal preferences. True, a willful judge can simply give effect to
his prejudices under the guise of applying the law, at least until reversed by a higher court of appeal (if there is one). But this is no
modem discovery. And it is no more a threat to the possibility of law's
objectivity than is the fact that people sometimes behave immorally a
threat to the objectivity of morals. Just as a conscientious man strives
to conform his behavior to what he judges to be the standards of
moral rectitude, the conscientious judge strives to rule in conformity
with the controlling rules of law. And no account of the phenomenon
of law which ignores the self-understanding of such a judge-no account which, that is to say, leaves his point of view out of accountcan do justice to the facts.
This, I think, was clear to H.L.A. Hart. He above all other English-speaking juridical thinkers, in the wake of legal realism, recog35

SeeJEROME FRANiK, LAW AND TIE MODERN MIND

(6th ed. 1949).
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nized that the shortcomings of legal skepticism and the radical denial
of law's objectivity had mainly to do, not with the dangers of its project
of debunking to the body politic by its capacity to undermine the public's faith in the rule of law, but rather with realism's inability realistically to account for the phenomenon of law as it functions in human
societies. Realist theories failed to fit the facts. And they failed to fit
the facts because they approached the phenomenon of law from a
purely external viewpoint. The problem, according to Hart, was not
that legal realists were bad lawyers; it was that they were bad psychologists and social scientists, even as they looked to psychology and social
science to explain the phenomenon of law.
Social phenomena-phenomena created or constituted, at least
in part, by human judgment, choice, cooperation, etc.-can never adequately be understood, Hart argued, without adopting what he called
the "internal point of view."'3 6 This is the point of view of those who
do not "merely record and predict behavior conforming to rules" or
understand legal requirements as mere "signs of possible punishment," but rather "use the rules as standards for the appraisal of their
37
own and others' behavior."
On this score, Hart faulted not only the legal realists, but also the
leading figures in his own intellectual tradition, the tradition of analytical jurisprudence inspired by Thomas Hobbes and developed byjeremy Bentham and his disciple John Austin. The problem with their
jurisprudential theories, Hart observed, is that they too fail to fit the
facts. And they fail to fit the facts because they do not take into account the practical reasoning of people whose choices and actions
create and constitute the phenomenon of law-people for whom
legal rules function as reasons for decisions and actions. 38
Hart in no way denied the wide variability of legal rules. Beyond
some basic requirements of any legal system-what Hart called the
"minimum content of natural law"-there could be, and in fact one
finds in the world, a great deal of variation from legal system to legal
system. But in all societies that have achieved a legal order-that is,
moved from a prelegal order to a regime of law-law exhibits a certain objectivity and autonomy from other phenomena, including
other normative systems. And the law of any system is not truly under36 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 11-18 (1980). For a critique of Hart's idea of the importance of the internal point of view from a perspective
sympathetic to Hart's legal positivism, see Jules Coleman, Authority andReason, in THE
AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITmSM 287 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
37 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 95-96 (1961).
38 For a defense of Austin and Bentham against Hart's criticisms, see L.Jonathan
Cohen, Critical Notice: Hart, The Concept of Law, 71 MIND 395 (1962).
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stood by the theorist proposing to give an intellectually satisfying account of that system until he understands the practical point of the
law from the perspective of actors within the system who do not perceive their own deliberations, choices, and actions to be "caused," but
rather understand themselves to be making laws for reasons and acting on reasons provided by the laws.
In his masterwork, The Concept of Law, Hart invited his readers to
treat his analysis as "an essay in descriptive sociology."39 But his was a
sociology designed to make possible the understanding of legal systems "from the inside." So what he proposed, and what the tradition
of analytical jurisprudence has now more or less fully accepted as
Hart's most enduring contribution, is that even "the descriptive theorist (whose purposes are not practical) must proceed.., by adopting a
practical point of view[; he must] assess importance or significance in
similarities and differences within his subject-matter by asking what
would be considered important or significant in that field by those
whose concerns, decisions, and activities create or constitute the sub40
ject-matter."
If Hart rejected the externalism of Bentham and Austin-with its
understanding of law (in Hobbesian fashion) as constituted by commands of a sovereign ("orders backed by threats") who is habitually
obeyed by a populace but who in turn obeys no one-he retained
their commitment to "legal positivism." He described this much misunderstood commitment as the acknowledgment of a "conceptual
separation" of law and morals. Although he was yet another moderate
liberal in his politics, Hart did not mean by "positivism" the idea that
law ought not to embody or enforce moral judgments. True, in his
famous debate with Patrick Devlin over the legal enforcement of
morals, 41 Hart defended a modified version of J.S. Mill's "harm principle" as the appropriate norm for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate state enforcement of morality; but he fully recognized that
this principle itself was proposed as a norm of political morality to be
embodied in, and respected by, the law. Moreover, he understood
perfectly well that the content of legal rules reflected nothing so
much as the moral judgments prevailing in any society regarding the
subject matters regulated by law. So Hart cheerfully acknowledged
the many respects in which law and morality were connected, both
39 HART, supra note 37, at vii.
40 FNmms, supra note 36, at 12.
41 See PATRICK DEVLrN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); H.L.A. HART,
LmRTY AND MORAry (1963).

LA.W,
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normatively and descriptively. In what respect, then, did he insist on
their "conceptual separation?"
As I read The Concept of Law, as well as Hart's later writings, the
"conceptual separation" thesis strikes me as rather modest. It has to
do above all, I think, with the legitimate aspiration of the descriptive
sociologist to keep his descriptions, to the extent possible, free of coloration by his own normative moral views. One can recognize a law,
or even a whole legal system, as a law or legal system, irrespective of
whether one believes that that law or legal system is just; indeed, even
a gravely unjust legal system can be, from a meaningful descriptive
viewpoint, a legal system. And what is true of the descriptive sociologist or legal theorist can also be true of the judge who may conclude
in a given case that the law-identified by authoritative criteria or
standards of legality-provides a rule of decision in the case at hand
which is, from the moral point of view, defective. In repudiating what
he took-wrongly, in my view-to be the defining proposition of the
natural law theorist, Hart denied in an unnecessarily wholesale fashion the proposition lex iniusta non est lex.
Although his views in fundamental moral theory are frustratingly
elusive, nothing in Hart's positivism commits him in any way to the'
moral skepticism, subjectivism, or relativism characteristic of the positivism of, say, Hans Kelsen, 42 or that one detects in the extrajudicial
writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes. In fact, the student of Hart's who
has remained closest to his views in legal theory, Joseph Raz, combines
Hartian legal positivism with a robust moral realism.4 Hart and Raz
have both insisted-rightly, in my view-on the necessity of some conceptual separation of law and morality for the sake of preserving the
possibility of moral criticism of law. As John Finnis has recently observed, the necessary separation "is effortlessly established [by Aquinas] in the Summa, [by] taking human positive law as a subject for
consideration in its own right (and its own name), a topic readily
identifiable and identified prior to any question about its relation to
'4 4
morality.
Nevertheless, Hart's positivism generated one of the century's
most fruitful jurisprudential debates when it was challenged by Lon L.
Fuller in the late 1950s. 4 5 Fuller-whose careful explication and
42

See Hans Kelsen, The Natural-Law DoctrineBefore the Tribunal of Science, in WHAT
JusTIcE, LAW, AND POLITICS IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE: COLLECTED ESSAY'S
BY HANS KELSEN 137 (1971).
43 See generally JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALrr OF FREEDOM (1986).
44 John Finnis, The Truth in Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
LEGAL POSITIVISM 195, 203-04 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
45 See LON L. FULLER, THE MOnAtrrA OF LAW (1969).
IsJusTicE?
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working out of the diverse elements of the Aristotelian ideal of the
"Rule of Law" constitutes a genuine achievement of twentieth century
legal philosophy--proposed an argument to show that law and morality are, as a matter of brute fact, more tightly connected than Hart's
positivism would allow. He sought to show that law necessarily embodies an "internal morality' that defies Hart's "conceptual separation" thesis. 4 6 He offered to argue the point, not as a normative
matter about moral standards that positive law ought to meet, but
rather on Hart's own terms, as a descriptive proposition about moral
standards that law has to embody before even the purely descriptive
theorist can recognize it as law.
In the Morality of Law, Fuller offered an apparently "value free"
definition of law that any legal positivist ought to be able to accept:
"Law is the enterprise of subjecting of human behavior to the governance of norms. '47 Nothing in this definition demands that those who
make and enforce the laws be wise, virtuous, benign, or concerned in
any way for the common good. Still, some things follow from it. For
example, people cannot conform their behavior to rules which have
not been promulgated, or which lack at least some measure of clarity,
or which apply retrospectively. So promulgation, clarity, and prospectivity are aspects of the "Rule of Law." Where they are absent, no legal
system exists or, at most, only a highly defective legal system exists.
And there are other requirements, including some significant measure of reliable conformity of official action with stated rules. Taken
together, Fuller argued, the "Rule of Law" constitutes a moral
achievement.
While adherence to the "Rule of Law" does not guarantee that a
legal system will be perfectly just-in fact, all legal systems contain
elements of injustice-it does mean that a certain minimum set of
moral standards must be met before a legal system actually exists.
And, sure enough, or so Fuller supposed, grave injustice is rarely
found in systems in which the rulers-whatever their personal vices
and bad motives-govern by law. It is in societies in which the "Rule
of Law" is absent that the most serious injustices occur. Of course,
Hart wasn't buying this for a moment. While he admired and for the
most part accepted Fuller's brilliant explication of the "Rule of Law,"
he saw no reason to refer to its content as an internal morality. He
contended, moreover, that there is no warrant for supposing that a
system of law could not be gravely unjust, or that the "Rule of Law"
46 For Hart's response, see H.L.A. Hart, The Morality of Law, 78 HARv. L.
1281 (1964-65).
47 LON FULLER, THE MORAI=Ty OF THE LAw 106 (2d ed. 1969).
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provided any very substantial bulwark against grave injustice. Indeed,
Raz later argued against Fuller that the "Rule of Law" was analogous
to a sharp knife-valuable for good purposes, to be sure, but equally
48
useful to rulers in the pursuit of evil objectives.
The Hart/Fuller debate (like the Hart/Devlin debate) was an illuminating one. I count on it every year for one or two lively meetings
of my seminar in Philosophy of Law at Princeton. My own judgment is
that Fuller scored a powerful point in establishing a certain moral
value of the "Rule of Law," but that Hart rightly resisted Fuller's somewhat exaggerated moral claims on its behalf. In any event, I do not
think that Fuller undermined the central appeal of the "conceptual
separation" thesis: the methodological aspiration to avoid confusing
"law as it is" with "law as it ought to be."
Nor do I think that Ronald Dworkin's celebrated critiques of
Hart's positivism are telling.49 Hart's theory has, as I have suggested,
certain implications for the question Dworkin has been most concerned about-namely, the question of judicial discretion in "hard
cases"-but these implications are quite limited. Hart is fimdamentally interested in developing methodological tools to enable the descriptive legal theorist to give a refined and accurate account of law in
a given society. Thus, for example, he proposes the union of "primary" and "secondary" rules as "the key to the science of jurisprudence"; he distinguishes "duty-imposing" from "power-conferring"
rules; and he develops the idea of a rule (or rules) of recognition to
which actors in a legal system have resort as establishing criteria of
legal validity. Hart's jurisprudence is not "court-centered." In this respect, it differs sharply from the jurisprudence of Dworkin and most
other American legal philosophers, including, interestingly enough,
Holmes and the legal realists.
For Hart, the question of how much law-creating (or "legislative")
authority a judge has, if any, or where that authority obtains, is not to
be resolved at the level of general jurisprudence. Different legal systems differ-indeed, reasonably differ-on the question of how such
lawmaking authority is to be allocated among judges and other actors
in the overall political system. To be sure, Hart observes that legal
rules are inevitably "open textured" and, thus, in need of authoritative
interpretation in their concrete application; and this entails a certain
SeeJoseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AuTHoRrl oF LAW: EssAYs
MORAITY 226 (Joseph Raz ed., 1979).
49 See RONALD DWORKIN, TARING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 1-130 (1977). For Dworkin's
more recent criticisms of legal positivism, see RoNALD DwoRIN, LAw's EMPIRE ch. 3
(1986). For Hart's reply to Dworkin, see HART, supra note 37, at 238-76.
48
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measure ofjudicial discretion and lawmaking authority as a matter of
fact, even in those systems which exclude it in theory. Does this mean
that the wall between legal validity and the moral judgment of judges
is porous, even in systems of avowed legislative supremacy (such as the
British system)? Yes, indeed. Does it vindicate Dworkin's "right answer" thesis? Not at all. Hart's legal positivism is, in fact, completely
compatible with the recognition that judges in some legal systems are
invited or even bound under the positive law of the constitution to
bring moral judgment to bear in deciding cases at law. Hart's is not a
theory designed to show judges how they can resolve cases without
making moral judgments, though neither is it a theory offering to justify their doing so (as Dworkin's is). The theory simply isn't addressed
to such questions.
What I think Hart is to be faulted for is a certain failure to see
and develop the fuller implications of his own refutation of
Benthamite and Austinian positivism and of his adoption of the internal point of view. Some of these implications are acknowledged by
Raz in his recent work.50 The central or focal case of a legal system, to
borrow a principle of Aristotle's method in social study, is one in
which legal rules and principles function as practical reasons for citizens, as well as judges and other officials, because of people's apprehension of their moral value. Aquinas's famous practicaldefinition of
law as an ordinance of reason directed to the common good here has
its significance in descriptive legal theory. As Finnis remarks,
[I]f we consider the reasons people have for establishing systems of
positive law (with power to override immemorial custom), and for
maintaining them (against the pull of strong passions and individual self-interest), and for reforming and restoring them when they
decay or collapse, [we find that] only those moral reasons [on
which many of those people often act] suffice to explain why such
people's under-taking takes the shape it does, giving legal systems
the many defining features they have-features which a careful descriptive account such as H.L.A. Hart's identifies as characteristic of
the central case of positive law and the focal meaning of "law," and
which therefore have a place in an adequate concept (understand5
ing and account) of positive law. '
Yet Hart himself, in The Concept of Law and elsewhere, declined to
distinguish central from peripheral cases of the internal point of view
50 SeeJoseph Raz, Formalismand the Rule of Law, in NATURAL LAw THEORY. CONTEmPoRARY ESSAYS 339 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). See generally Neil MacCormick,
NaturalLaw and the Separationof Law and Morals, in NATURAL LAw THEORY. CoNTEMPoEssAs 105 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
51 See Finnis, supra note 44, at 204.
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itself. Thus, he treated cases of obedience to law by virtue of "unreflecting inherited attitudes" and even the "mere wish to do as others
do" from morally motivated obedience of fidelity to law. These "considerations and attitudes," like those which boil down to mere selfinterest or the avoidance of punishment, are, as Finnis says, "diluted
or watered-down instances of the practical viewpoint that brings law
into being as a significantly differentiated type of social order and
maintains it as such. Indeed, they are parasitic upon that
'5 2
viewpoint.
This is in no way to deny any valid sense to the positivist insistence
on the "conceptual separation" of law and morality. It is merely to
highlight the ambiguity of the assertion of such a separation and the
need to distinguish, even more clearly than Hart did, between the respects in which such a separation obtains and those in which it does
not. Still less is it to suggest that belief in natural law or other forms of
moral realism entails the proposition that law and morality are connected in such a way as to confer upon judges as such a measure of
plenary authority to enforce the requirements of natural law or to legally invalidate provisions of positive law they judge to be in conflict
with these requirements. Important work by Finnis and others has
clearly identified the misguidedness of such a suggestion. The truth
of the proposition lex iniusta non est lex is a moral truth, namely, that
the moral obligation created by authoritative legal enactment-that is
to say, by positive law-is conditionalrather than absolute. The prima
facie moral obligation to obey the law is defeasible.
What about law's objectivity? Does law "exist" prior to legal decision? Can judicial reasoning be guided by standards internal to the
legal materials? At the end of the twentieth century we can, I think,
affirm a position more subtle than the one Holmes asserted at the end
of the nineteenth. Yes, the standards to guide judicial reasoning can
be internal to the law of a system that seeks to make them so, though
never perfectly. Positive law is a human creation-a cultural artifactthough it is largely created for moral purposes, for the sake of justice
and the common good. That is to say, law exists in what Aristotelians
would call the order of technique, but it is created in that order precisely for the sake of purposes that obtain in the moral order. So, for
moral reasons, we human beings create normative systems of enforceable social rules that enjoy, to a significant extent, a kind of autonomy
from morality as such. We deliberately render these rules susceptible
to technical application and analysis for purposes of, for example,
fairly and finally establishing limits on freedom of conduct, as well as
52

FINNis, supra note 36, at 14.

1999]

ONE HUNDRED

YEARS

OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

1549

resolving disputes among citizens, or between citizens and governments, or between governments at different levels. And to facilitate
this application and analysis we bring into being a legal profession,
from which we also draw our judges, that is composed of people
trained in programs of study that teach not, or notjust, moral philosophy, but the specific tools and techniques of research, interpretation,
58
reasoning, and argument relevant to legal analysis.
To stress law's objectivity and relative autonomy from morality is
by no means to deny the Thomistic proposition thatjust positive law is
derived from the natural law. For Aquinas himself did not suppose
that positive law was anything other than a cultural artifact, a human
creation, albeit a creation of great moral worth brought into being
largely for moral purposes. Nor did he suppose that a single form or
regime of law was uniquely correct for all times and places. His stress
on detrminationes by which human lawmakers give effect to the requirements of natural law in the shape of positive law for the common
good of their communities-enjoying, to a considerable extent, the
creative freedom Aquinas analogized to that of the architect-reveals
his awareness of the legitimate potentially very wide variability of
human laws. Whomever Holmes may have had in mind in criticizing
those "text writers" who saw law as a set of deductions from a few axioms of reason, the charge has no applicability to Aquinas. In this, as
in so many other respects, the Angelic Doctor was a man of the twentieth century and-if I may engage in a bit of prediction and prophecy
myself-of the twenty-first and beyond.

53 I develop these thoughts at greater length in Natural Law and Positive Law, in
Ti AUTONOMY OF LAWv: ESSAYS IN LEGAL POSITIVISM, supra note 43, at 321.
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